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Abstract
Population ageing exerts considerable pressure on the funding of public transfers. It is of utmost importance to understand how the transfer system can adapt to population ageing. Using National Transfer Accounts, we illustrate the
different organisation of transfer systems across Europe. Countries like Greece and Romania, where labour income
already falls short of consumption at age 54, would greatly improve their public system sustainability by following the
Swedish example where this happens ten years later. High consumption at older ages is less problematic when ﬁnanced
substantially through savings (the UK) rather than almost exclusively through transfers (Austria).
Keywords: National Transfer Accounts, Economic dependency, European Union, Population ageing, Public system
JEL classiﬁcation: J11, J16, J18

Introduction

I

t is characteristic of the economic life course that
there are periods of economic dependency in
childhood and old age. During these periods (part
of) an individual's consumption is not covered by
labour income but has to be ﬁnanced by transfers
and by asset-based reallocations such as asset income and the disposal of assets. During childhood,
dependency is mainly ﬁnanced by familial transfers
from parents to their children and by public transfers in the form of education. In old age, the most
important transfers are public transfers in the form
of pensions and health services.
The European countries are undergoing profound
changes in their population age structure. Eurostat
population projections show that the proportion of
the European Union's (EU) population aged 20e64 is
expected to decrease from 60% in 2016 to 51.9% in
2050. At the same time, the proportion of the population aged 65þ is expected to increase from 19.2% to
28.1%. In contrast, the proportion of the population
aged 0e19 is projected to be fairly stable over the

projection period at approximately 20.0% (Eurostat,
2019). The increasing share of dependent elderly
persons exerts pressure on the funding of the public
transfer systems. To adapt the system to the changing age structure, it is necessary to either increase the
tax burden on the working-age generations, decrease
the level of beneﬁts paid to elderly persons, or have
people stay longer in the labour market.
The degree of economic dependence and the
relative importance of the different channels of agebased reallocation of resources are different across
countries. Consequently, population ageing affects
the European countries to different degrees and in
different ways. The aggregate economic data, in
particular the System of National Accounts (SNA),
includes no age-speciﬁc information about economic categories such as income, transfers, consumption, and savings. The lack of information on
age-speciﬁc economic activities severely limits the
understanding of both the economic consequences
of population ageing and the interactions between
private and public systems in the reallocation of
income among age groups (United Nations, 2013).
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In this paper, we use National Transfer Accounts
(NTA) to measure important dimensions of the age
reallocation systems across Europe and to analyse
the consequences of demographic changes. By
introducing the age dimension into the SNA, the
NTA measures age-speciﬁc income, the redistribution of income among age groups through public
and private transfers and the age-speciﬁc use of
income for consumption and saving.
We present the paper's main ﬁndings based on
the NTA age proﬁles for EU countries that we
derived using harmonised data sources and the
same analytical procedures for the ﬁrst time (Istenic,

Hammer, Seme,
Lotric Dolinar & Sambt, 2017). This
approach ensures perfect comparability of the results, and supplements ﬁndings on long-term economic sustainability in times of population ageing.
It takes a broader perspective on sustainability in
the EU countries than just the public sector, which is
regularly monitored in the EU countries (European
Commission, 2018) by also including private age
reallocations. The country-speciﬁc ranking, based
on indicators that we present, enable us to identify
the nature of imbalances and suggest strategies for
dealing with the pressure of population ageing on
the sustainability of the public ﬁnance system.
We start by presenting the National Transfer Accounts methodology and the data used. Section 2
shows the main characteristics of the consumption
and labour income age proﬁles in the EU countries.
In Section 3, the level of old age dependency and the
sources through which dependency is ﬁnanced are
presented for 25 EU countries. Section 4 is dedicated
to the level of gender-speciﬁc economic surplus
provided by the working age population. We
conclude by comparing the different organisation of
transfers across countries, and by identifying strategies that might be used to deal with the consequences of population ageing.

1 Methodology and data
A brief description of the NTA methodology and
presentation of the NTA results for 23 countries
around the world is given in Lee and Mason (2011).
A comprehensive description of the methodology is
presented in the United Nations (2013) Manual.
Speciﬁcs of the European NTA results are presented
in the European NTA manual (Istenic et al., 2017).
The NTA methodology is based on an individual's
budget constraint, where an individual's inﬂows and
outﬂows have to match. Since NTA builds upon the
SNA data, we take into account categories related to
the market economy that constitutes the GDP. Inﬂows include labour income, asset income, and
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transfers received, whereas outﬂows include consumption, savings and transfers given. By rearranging these terms, we obtain the NTA ﬂow
identity where consumption minus labour income
represents the life cycle deﬁcit (LCD), which equals
net transfers (transfers received minus transfers
given) plus asset-based reallocations (asset income
minus savings). Children and the elderly face a
positive life cycle deﬁcit, indicating their economic
dependence. On the other hand, at working ages,
people face a negative life cycle deﬁcit: a life cycle
surplus. The life cycle surplus enables the working
age population to ﬁnance the life cycle deﬁcit of the
dependent population.
The NTA methodology comprehensively analyses
both public and private transfers, and public and
private asset-based reallocations. Public transfer
inﬂows include public expenditure on education,
health, pensions, and so on, whereas public transfer
outﬂows mainly consist of taxes and social contributions paid. Private transfers include ﬂows between households (inter-household transfers) and
within households (intra-household transfers).
Inter-household transfers include transfers between
households in different countries and within country. We use data on net private transfers from the
rest of the world (ROW), including remittances that
are reported in the SNA, for the aggregate value of
inter-household transfers between countries. It
turns out that in our analysed countries intrahousehold transfers are much more prevalent than
inter-household transfers. Public and private assetbased reallocations result from participation in the
capital and ﬁnancial markets, and include returns
on capital, interest paid on loans, and so on. The
unit of analysis in the NTA is the individual,
whereas public or private institutions only represent
intermediaries between individuals.
Analysing economic ﬂows requires estimating a
large set of ‘age proﬁles’. Age proﬁles are age-speciﬁc averages of further decomposed variables
included in the ﬂow identity. By applying the NTA
methodology, in the ﬁrst step, we derive aggregate
values for the variables using the SNA data and
other related sources. In the next step, we estimate
the relative distributions of variables over age
groups using survey or administrative data. We
then multiply age proﬁles from the second step by
the adequate adjustment factor, so that the sum of
the age-speciﬁc average multiplied by the population by age matches the aggregate value from the
ﬁrst step. We eliminate the random factors using the
smoothing procedure for most of the age proﬁles
(those resting on the sample data) (United Nations,
2013).

186

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW 2021;23:184e193

The NTA results are cross-sectional snapshots
based on secondary data. We use the EU Statistics
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey
to estimate the income-related age proﬁles, and the
Household Budget Survey (HBS) to estimate private
consumption age proﬁles. One of the main contributions of the NTA methodology is the ability to
estimate the private transfers ﬂowing within a
household. Private intra-household transfers are
estimated as a residual category, assuming that
household members whose disposable income is
smaller than their private consumption receive
transfers from other household members facing a
surplus (their disposable income exceeds private
consumption). If the total household surplus is not
sufﬁcient to cover total household deﬁcit, the
household head must use asset income or to borrow
assets to cover the difference.
We present NTA results for 25 EU countries in
2010 in this paper. The results are further decomposed by gender. The gender-speciﬁc NTA is estimated in a similar way as the standard NTA. When
age proﬁles are estimated using survey data, the
only difference is that we calculate age- and genderspeciﬁc averages instead of only age-speciﬁc averages. Because gender-speciﬁc macroeconomic aggregates are generally not available, the genderspeciﬁc age proﬁles are adjusted in such a way as to
achieve consistency with the standard NTA estimates. To do so, we sum the gender-speciﬁc age
proﬁles multiplied by age- and gender-speciﬁc
population and equalise the sum with the age proﬁle for the total population multiplied by the number of individuals at that age (Donehower, 2014).
The next subsections present the NTA methodology
and the data used in a more detailed way.
1.1 Labour income, consumption and economic life
cycle
The total labour income, as deﬁned by NTA,
consists of the gross earnings of employees
(including employer's social contributions) and selfemployment labour income. While the aggregate
value of earnings can be directly estimated using the
European System of Accounts (ESA), this is not the
case for self-employment labour income. As ESA
includes only values of gross mixed income, that
includes returns on capital and labour, the aggregate value for self-employment labour income is
estimated using two-thirds of the gross mixed income, while the rest is devoted to the capital income. As EU-SILC includes data for gross earnings,
an employer's social contributions and selfemployment labour income at the individual level,

the age proﬁle of total labour income can be easily
estimated as the sum of smoothed and adjusted agespeciﬁc averages of the three subcomponents. In
most EU countries, the income reported in EU-SILC
refers to the calendar year preceding the interview.
We therefore use EU-SILC 2011 to estimate incomerelated age proﬁles for 2010. In EU-SILC 2011 variable age is reported at the end of income reference
period, and therefore, for the year 2010.
Total consumption, as deﬁned by NTA, includes
public and private consumption. Both public and
private consumption are further divided into: 1)
education, 2) health, and 3) other private or public
consumption. Because ESA does not include
aggregate values of private and public consumption
subcategories, the aggregate values for private
consumption subcategories are calculated by using
the Classiﬁcation of Individual Consumption by
Purpose (COICOP), and the aggregate values for
public consumption subcategories by using Classiﬁcation of the Functions of Government (COFOG).
The private consumption age proﬁles are mainly
estimated using HBS 2010 data. Because private
consumption expenditure in HBS is reported only at
the household level, we need to use different allocation rules to distribute household expenditure
among its members. First, the individual-speciﬁc
private expenditure on education is estimated by
dividing the level-speciﬁc household expenditure
between the members enrolled in this speciﬁc level
of education. In doing so, we assume that unit costs
are the same for all the household members
enrolled in the speciﬁc level of education, independent of their age. Secondly, the age allocation of
household private health expenditures is estimated
using a regression method without a constant term.
Speciﬁcally, we regress household health expenditure on the number of household members of a
speciﬁc ten-year age group. The regression coefﬁcients are then used as weights for distributing
total household health expenditure among its
members. Finally, we allocate other private household expenditure among its members using the
following equivalence scale: individuals aged 20 or
older have the same consumption share, which
equals 1. It is assumed that children below the age
of 4 consume 0.4 of the consumption of an adult. For
individuals aged 4e20, the consumption share increases linearly from 0.4 to 1.0 of the consumption of
an adult.
To estimate public consumption age proﬁles, we
need to deﬁne the beneﬁciaries of different public
programmes. We therefore separate individual
public consumption (where beneﬁciaries of a speciﬁc programme are known) and collective public

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW 2021;23:184e193

consumption (where the beneﬁciaries are all the
individuals). Data on public consumption is not
available from household surveys, and is usually
found from administrative data, government reports, and so on. Like private consumption, we
divide public consumption into three main categories: education, health, and public consumption
other than education and health. First, the public
education consumption age proﬁle is estimated by
combing the data on educational level expenditure
with the age- and level-speciﬁc enrolment rates. As
in case of private education expenditure, we assume
that the unit cost of public education is equal for all
enrolled in the speciﬁc level of education, independent of their age. Secondly, because there is no
available administrative data source that offers
comparable data on public health expenditure for
all EU countries, the age proﬁle of public health
consumption is estimated based on pre-calculated
age proﬁles of health care consumption accessed by
the Ageing Working Group (AWG). The age proﬁles
from the AWG 2012 report (European Commission,
2012) are adjusted to the appropriate country-speciﬁc aggregates from 2010. Finally, we estimate
“other public consumption” by decomposing it into
two categories: individual and collective consumption. Because collective consumption includes consumption of public goods, such as national security,
street lightning and so on, which is consumed by all
individuals, we distribute collective public consumption equally among all the individuals.
Whenever possible, however, we treat consumption
as individual and allocate it by age. For example, we
assume that ‘old age’ and ‘disability’ beneﬁts have
the same shape as long-term care, also accessed by
AWG, while ‘unemployment’, ‘family and children’,
and ‘housing’ beneﬁts are allocated by age using the
corresponding cash categories explained bellow.
In the next step, we calculate the difference between total consumption and total labour income,
giving us the value of the life cycle deﬁcit. The LCD
is typically positive for the young and the elderly
and negative during the prime working ages. The
positive LCD of the young and the elderly is founded by the working-age population in the form of
public and private transfers and public and private
asset-based reallocations.
1.2 Public and private transfers and asset-based
reallocations
Net public transfers show the difference between
public transfer inﬂows and public transfer outﬂows.
Public transfer inﬂows include in-kind and in-cash
transfers. In-cash transfers are monetary transfers
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received directly by individuals from the government, such as pensions, unemployment beneﬁts,
and so on. On the other hand, public transfers inkind, by deﬁnition, are equal to public consumption
explained above. The aggregate controls of different
kinds of in-cash public transfers are based on data
from the European System of Integrated Social
Protection Statistics (ESSPROS), while age proﬁles
are estimated using the EU-SILC survey data.
Sickness, disability, old age, survivors’, and unemployment beneﬁts are reported in the EU-SILC at
the individual level, whereas family, children and
housing beneﬁts only at the household level. Based
on the NTA methodology, family and childrenrelated allowances are distributed to all the adults in
the household, while housing beneﬁts are assigned
to the household head.
Public transfer outﬂows show the economic resources that ﬂow from private sector (individuals or
ﬁrms) to the government. They are used to ﬁnance
public transfer inﬂows, public asset income or
public saving. Public transfer outﬂows mainly
include taxes and social contributions. The NTA
distinguishes public transfer outﬂows by the activity
that is being taxed, meaning that taxes are separated
into taxes on asset income, taxes on labour income,
and taxes on consumption. We also distinguish social contributions paid by employers and employees, and those paid by the non-employed. The
age proﬁles of public transfer outﬂows subcategories are based on the pre-calculated age proﬁles of the activity being taxed. For example, the age
proﬁle of taxes on labour income is based on the
labour income age proﬁle, while the age proﬁle of
taxes on consumption of goods and services on the
private consumption age proﬁle.
Private transfers are inter vivos transfers that ﬂow
between households (i.e. inter-household transfers)
and within households (i.e. intra-household transfers). Inter-household private transfers include
transfers between households (such as alimony
payments and gifts) and indirect household transfers mediated by the non-proﬁt institutions serving
households (such as donations). At the aggregate
level, the difference between inter-household
transfer inﬂows and outﬂows is the net private
transfers from the rest of the world (ROW). The age
proﬁles of inter-household transfers are based on
the EU-SILC data, however, because transfers
received or given are reported only at the household
level, we assume that inter-household transfer inﬂows and outﬂows ﬂow only to and from the
household head.
The estimation of intra-household transfers is one
of the main contributions of the NTA. While intra-
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household transfers equal zero at the aggregate
level, there is a signiﬁcant age distribution for such
transfers. Intra-household transfers are estimated
indirectly by using the household structure from
EU-SILC and the pre-calculated age proﬁles. Intrahousehold transfers are estimated as the difference
between age-speciﬁc disposable income and agespeciﬁc private consumption. Those household
members whose consumption exceeds their
disposable income are in deﬁcit and have to receive
transfers from other household members who are in
surplus (their disposable income exceeds consumption). If the total deﬁcit of the household exceeds the total surplus, the household head has to
fund this gap through asset-based reallocations, for
example, by borrowing assets. In contrast, when
total household surplus exceeds the total deﬁcit, the
household head saves (or buys assets).
The NTA distinguishes between public and private asset-based reallocations (ABR), presenting the
difference between (public or private) asset income
and (public or private) savings. Public ABR equals
the public transfer deﬁcit or surplus. In general, a
public transfer deﬁcit is generated when the taxes
and social contributions paid by the private sector
are not enough to cover public transfer inﬂows. The
government therefore has to cover the deﬁcit
through positive ABR (i.e. by issuing new debt). The
age proﬁles of public asset income and public
saving are estimated by using the age proﬁle of
public transfer outﬂows. This is assumed, because
the taxpayers are those who need to cover public
deﬁcit and are those who beneﬁt from the surplus.
Private ABR also present the difference between
asset income (capital and property one) and savings.
The age proﬁles of private asset-income subcategories are estimated using the EU-SILC data.
Because asset-income is reported only at the
household level, we again assume that the household head is the only household member who owns
the assets.

2 Consumption and labour income
The consequences of population ageing are
determined by the speed of ageing and by the
design of the economic life cycle. Fig. 1 presents the
age pattern of (public and private) consumption and
labour income for four selected European countries,
as well as the average of 25 EU countries (all EU
Member States except Malta, Croatia and the
Netherlands). The basic pattern is common in all the
countries. The market consumption of very young
children is low, but increases strongly once they
enter the educational system. Education is

responsible for the peak of the consumption age
proﬁle at age 10e14. For Sweden, Italy and the
EU25, including many countries not presented in
Fig. 1, the age proﬁles reﬂect the lower average
consumption at age 40e50, when income and consumption goods are shared by parents with their
own children. There is another consumption peak at
older ages due to high private consumption around
age 60 (consumption no longer shared with their
children since they have moved out) and the consumption of health and long-term care services at
older ages. The labour income for the EU25 is higher
than consumption only in the 27 to 57 age groups
with zero or very low values in childhood and old
age, which is much narrower than the demographically deﬁned working age group of 20e64 years.
There are also important cross-country differences that will determine the consequences of
population ageing for the transfer system. In Table
1, we present the age at which labour income ﬁrst
exceeds consumption (‘LCS starts at’) and age at
which labour income again drops below the consumption (‘LCS ends at’) for all countries. The LCS
is deﬁned as labour income minus consumption. In
Sweden, for example, people stay in the labour force
longer than in other countries. A higher employment rate at older ages is beneﬁcial for the sustainability of the public system and makes it less
vulnerable to population ageing. It turns out that by
moving towards the age pattern of labour income in
Sweden, the EU countries could neutralise most of
the projected increase in public expenditure due to
the population ageing (Loichinger et al., 2017). On
the other hand, Italy is characterised by a high level
of consumption which, together with an old population, will translate into the high economic dependence of elderly people (see Fig. 2). Austria and the
United Kingdom (UK) have similar age patterns of
labour income, but per-capita consumption in old
age is considerably higher in the UK. These proﬁles
can be explained by the fact that the savings rate is
lower in the UK than in Austria, with the consequence that consumption relative to income is
higher.

3 Economic dependency e The life cycle
deﬁcit
The difference between consumption and labour
income in childhood and old age can serve as a
measure of economic dependency. As explained in
the methodology section, this difference has been
termed ‘life cycle deﬁcit’ (LCD) in the NTA framework. By adding up the age-speciﬁc LCD of the
elderly population, we determine the aggregate
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Fig. 1. Consumption and labour income in EU countries in 2010. Source: EU-SILC 2011; HBS 2010; Eurostat database; author calculations.

LCD for the elderly population. To facilitate comparison between countries, we relate aggregate LCD
to total labour income. The indicator measures the
total consumption of the elderly population that is
not covered by their own labour income relative to
total labour income in a country. The results are
shown in Fig. 2, together with the share of the LCD

that is covered by transfers and asset-based reallocations, and the projected values of the LCD in 2050.
The size of the life cycle deﬁcit reﬂects age-speciﬁc
patterns of economic activities and the level of
consumption and labour income, but also the population structure. Consequently, the results for 2010
and 2050 also reﬂect the age structure of the

Table 1. The length of the life cycle surplus (LCS) in years by countries; total and decomposed by sex.
Country

Positive LCS starts

Positive LCS ends

Total

Men

Women

Total

Men

Women

Total

Men

Women

Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Germany
Denmark
Estonia
Greece
Spain
Finland
France
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Latvia
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Sweden
Slovenia
Slovakia
United Kingdom

24.1
23.9
25.5
e
25.6
26.3
25.7
24.7
e
26.2
26.6
23.9
24.2
27.0
26.8
28.7
24.9
25.5
25.8
26.1
25.9
26.6
25.6
25.6
25.7

21.1
23.1
23.8
27.5
24.1
25.6
24.1
23.4
29.2
24.9
25.0
22.9
23.6
26.0
24.7
27.6
24.4
23.8
24.1
25.9
23.7
24.9
24.2
24.3
24.4

29.1
25.1
29.8
e
35.7
28.3
26.9
33.1
e
28.4
30.9
25.7
25.2
28.6
37.3
34.2
25.6
31.3
31.3
26.3
35.1
32.4
27.7
36.2
29.7

58.0
58.7
56.0
e
56.5
59.4
61.5
58.8
e
59.0
59.5
58.4
57.8
58.5
58.6
55.3
58.4
57.5
55.1
57.5
53.3
63.3
57.1
55.3
57.7

60.0
60.3
57.8
62.4
59.7
61.7
63.0
59.2
60.0
61.3
60.0
59.6
58.9
61.2
60.2
57.2
59.9
58.8
58.3
59.7
57.1
64.2
58.7
57.5
60.7

54.8
54.9
51.5
e
52.1
54.5
59.8
58.5
e
53.5
59.1
55.3
57.0
51.8
51.1
54.2
50.2
56.3
51.0
53.8
45.3
62.1
55.7
51.5
48.8

34.0
34.8
30.4
e
30.9
33.1
35.8
34.1
e
32.9
32.9
34.4
33.6
31.5
31.8
26.5
33.4
31.9
29.3
31.5
27.4
36.7
31.5
29.8
32.0

38.9
37.2
33.9
34.8
35.6
36.1
39.0
35.8
30.8
36.4
35.1
36.7
35.4
35.2
35.6
29.6
35.5
35.0
34.2
33.8
33.3
39.3
34.5
33.2
36.3

25.6
29.8
21.7
e
16.4
26.2
32.9
25.4
e
25.0
28.2
29.6
31.8
23.2
13.9
20.0
24.6
25.0
19.7
27.5
10.2
29.6
28.0
15.4
19.1

Source: EU-SILC 2011; HBS 2010; Eurostat database; authors' calculations.

Length of positive LCS
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Fig. 2. Financing the difference between consumption and labour income of elderly people in EU countries in 2010 and 2050. Source: EU-SILC 2011;
HBS 2010; Eurostat database; various other sources; author calculations.

population affected by longevity, migration, fertility,
the baby-boom generations gradually moving to
higher groups, and so on. The total LCD of the
elderly population amounts to 16e19% of total labour income in Cyprus, Ireland and Estonia, and
36e39%1 in Greece and Romania. In Romania,
average labour income already falls short of consumption at the age of 54, while the corresponding
age for the average EU citizen is 58. Greece and Italy
are characterised by a pronounced public redistribution to the elderly population, low saving rates,
low labour force participation rates and high unemployment. The LCD of elderly people in relation
to total labour income in Greece and Italy is therefore among the highest across all the countries. On
the other hand, in Sweden and Denmark, high labour force participation at older ages is reﬂected in
the comparable low aggregate LCD, and average
consumption only starts to exceed the labour income at ages 64 and 62 respectively.
To simulate the aggregate LCD until 2050, we
keep age-speciﬁc economic characteristics constant
at the level observed in 2010 and only vary the
population structure according to The Eurostat
(2019) Population Projections. Assuming that the
age-speciﬁc economic characteristics in 2050 will be
the same as in 2010 (relative to the labour income)
is a very strong assumption. In reality, this
assumption will be most likely violated for various
reasons including a) cohort effects, b) potentially

1

later retirement since individuals will collect the
required working period later (as a result of starting employment later due to higher tertiary education enrolment), and c) migration impacting the
pension expenditure relative to the number of
pensioners since the pensions paid to pensioners in
other countries will vary. The results should
therefore not be considered realistic projections of
the future development but rough estimates of how
severe the potential imbalances are across
countries.
The highest LCD in 2050 is projected for Romania
and Greece with LCDs of over 80% and 70% of total
labour income. Such values are clearly impossible to
maintain in the long term, and emphasise the need
for changes in the age pattern and level of intergenerational transfers. It is particularly alarming
that the countries with a high LCD in 2010 are also
those confronted with a fast and strongly ageing
population. On the other hand, high employment
rates combined with relatively favourable population projections lead to the lowest LCD in Sweden,
accounting for less than 30% of the total labour income in 2050. In contrast, the ranking of some
countries is projected to change substantially. The
population is ageing at a moderate pace in Belgium
and France, which is consequently reﬂected in a
moderate increase in the LCD. Slovakia and Poland,
on the other hand, are ageing more rapidly, which is
reﬂected in a strongly increasing LCD.

Due to rounding, the numbers presented in the ﬁgures may not add up precisely to the totals provided.
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Positive net migration is assumed for most EU
countries in the baseline demographic scenario. In
Fig. 2, therefore, we also present the results using
the No migration population projection available at
Eurostat (2019). Without migration, the life cycle
deﬁcit of elderly relative to total labour income
would be even larger in most EU countries, since
there would be no positive impact from young immigrants generating labour income. Unfortunately,
Eurostat does not provide any other scenario of
demographic projections except baseline projections
and the no migration scenario. In particular, we miss
sensitivity to mortality, whereas we know that the
impact of fertility assumption on the results would
be minor. In other words, by 2050 newborns will
only have a small impact on total labour income.
Without migration, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and
Germany would face much higher LCD in 2050 than
presented above, using baseline demographic
projections.
However, it is not only the level but also the
channels through which old-age dependency is
ﬁnanced that are of utmost importance for the economic consequences of population ageing. In
countries where elderly people rely on asset-based
reallocation (such as a funded pension system or
interests and dividends from private savings), the
strain on the public sector will be lower. Savings
and investment also have positive effects on the
economy (Mason & Lee, 2007; Prskawetz & Sambt,
2014). On the other hand, if elderly people mainly
rely on transfers, the economy is more vulnerable to
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an increasing ratio between the elderly and the
working-age population.
Fig. 2 distinguishes the part of the LCD that is
ﬁnanced through transfers and the part ﬁnanced
through asset-based reallocations. For example, in
Romania, Greece, Italy and Austria, the LCD that is
covered through transfers amounts to 19% of total
labour income. The corresponding values are 7% in
Ireland and 9% in Cyprus and Luxembourg. Oldage dependency in the UK, Germany, Luxembourg
and Ireland shrinks considerably once we take into
account only the part of LCD ﬁnanced through
transfers.

4 Economic surplus
Population ageing clearly increases the share of
the economically dependent elderly population and
the LCD. The pressure that this development exerts
on the funding of public transfers depends on the
ability of the working-age population to provide
these transfers. In analogy to the LCD, we use the
age-speciﬁc values of consumption and labour income to calculate the life cycle surplus (LCS),
deﬁned as the difference between labour income
and consumption.
The level of the surplus depends on an individual's age; however, there are also large gender
differences in the surplus that individuals generate
during their prime age (see Fig. 3). There is a
redistribution of income between genders within
households, and therefore, the differences in

Fig. 3. Consumption and labour income for men and women in EU countries in 2010. Source: EU-SILC 2011; HBS 2010; Eurostat database; author
calculations.
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consumption are rather small. The gender differences in the LCS are thus mainly caused by gender
differences in labour income. These differences
usually reﬂect considerable cross-country variations
in gender-speciﬁc enrolment and labour market
participation rates, and also differences in the
gender wage gap of fully employed men and
women. In Italy the labour income of women exceeds their consumption only around ages 40e50,
while in Slovenia this period lasts almost 30 years.
In Table 1, we present the results for all 25 EU
countries. LCS for men starts earlier and ends later
than for women in all countries. Consequently, the
LCS length for men is longer than for women but
with huge variability across countries. The difference ranges from only 3.6 years in Hungary to 23.1
in Romania and 21.7 in Italy, whereas in Greece and
Cyprus there is no LCS for women at all, because
their labour income does not exceed their consumption at any age.
In Fig. 4, we present the total value of LCS
relative to the total labour income, decomposed by
gender. The total LCS ranges from 12 to 13% of labour income in Lithuania and Greece, to more than
35% in Slovenia, Belgium and Luxembourg. We
observe a relationship between the LCS and the
contribution of women to total labour income.
Women's contribution to the LCS is highest in
Slovenia, Denmark, Sweden and Hungary. These
countries are also among those with the highest
total LCS. In Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Italy,
Slovakia and the UK, the surplus is (almost) entirely
generated by men. These countries have the

potential to increase their LCS and improve the
sustainability of the public system by increasing
labour market participation and the labour income
of women.

5 Discussion
The economic consequences of population ageing
depend on the degree of ageing and on the age
patterns of economic activity. While there are
common patterns of economic activity across European countries, there are large differences in the
degree of dependency, as well as the length of the
period an average person is dependent. This crosscountry variation allows us to identify strategies that
could be successful in reducing the negative consequences of population ageing, and in particular
the pressure on the funding of public transfers.
These strategies generally include: 1) reducing the
economic dependency of the elderly population,
and 2) increasing the ability of the working-age
population to support others.
Among the most efﬁcient strategies to decrease
economic dependency in old age is an increase in
the labour force participation of elderly people.
Sweden is clearly a role model in this regard, where
the average citizen stays in the labour market for
about ﬁve years longer than in the majority of European countries. Additionally, reducing the consumption level of the elderly population is
inevitable in some countries with particularly high
dependency ratios, such as Italy. The overall saving
rate of Italy was negative in 2010. To avoid a steady

Fig. 4. Life cycle surplus for men and women in EU countries in 2010. Source: EU-SILC 2011; HBS 2010; Eurostat database; various other sources;
author calculations.
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deterioration of economic conditions and a decrease
in the capital stock, consumption expenditure relative to income has to decrease.
A high economic dependency in old age is not
necessarily related to high pressure on the funding
of public transfers. In all countries, part of consumption in old age is ﬁnanced through asset-based
reallocation. The UK is characterised by comparatively high consumption in old age, but elderly
Britons ﬁnance a large part of consumption through
their own savings. Elderly people in Austria, in
contrast, ﬁnance their consumption mainly by
means of generous public transfers. The consequences of ageing for the public transfer system are
therefore more severe in Austria than in the UK.
The dependent elderly population can be supported if the surplus of the working-age population
is large enough. This in turn depends largely on
employment rates. The negative consequences of
population ageing can be avoided if it is possible to
increase the employment rates of the working-age
population, including a decrease in unemployment
and an increase in the labour force participation
rates of women. These measures could be the main
drivers of policy reforms in Europe.
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